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Abstract 
 
More than half of the countries in the world have introduced a reform process in their power sectors and 
billions of dollars have been spent on liberalizing electricity markets around the world. Ideological 
considerations, political composition of governments and educational/professional background of leaders 
have played and will play a crucial role throughout the reform process. Adapting a political economy 
perspective, this paper attempts to discover the impact of political economy variables on the 
liberalization process in electricity markets. Empirical models are developed and analyzed using panel 
data from 55 developed and developing countries covering the period 1975–2010. The research findings 
suggest that there is a significant negative relationship between electricity market liberalization and the 
size of industry sector, meaning that countries with larger industry sectors tend to liberalize less. Also, 
we detect a negative correlation between polity score and power sector liberalization, that is; it cannot be 
argued that liberalization policies are stronger in more democratic countries. On the other hand, our 
results imply that countries that receive foreign financial aid or assistance are more likely to liberalize 
their electricity markets. In OECD countries, single-party governments accelerate the reform process by 
reducing public ownership and vertical integration. Moreover, we detect a negative relationship between 
the years the chief executive has been in office and the reform progress in OECD countries. Furthermore, 
we identify a decrease in vertical integration in electricity industry during the terms of parties with 
“right” or “left” ideologies in OECD countries. Additionally, professional and educational background of 
head of executive branch (prime minister, president and so on) seem to have very significant impact on 
reform process in OECD countries, but this is not the case in non-OECD countries. Leaders with a 
professional background as entrepreneurs speed up electricity market liberalization process in OECD 
countries while those with a background as economists slow it down. As for educational background, the 
reforms seem to progress slower in OECD countries if the head of executive has an educational 
background in economics or natural science. As a final point, the study suggests that EU or OECD 
membership, the existence of electricity market reform idea, population density, electricity consumption, 
income level, educational level, imports of goods and services (as % of GDP) and country specific 
features have a strong correlation with liberalization process in electricity markets. 
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1. Introduction and conceptual framework 
 
By the 1980s, a number of political, financial and technical factors converged and started to undermine the logic that 
electricity industry should be handled via a vertically integrated (and usually state-owned) monopoly (Gratwick & 
Eberhard 2008). This shift has also been strongly encouraged by the World Bank, IMF and other international financial 
institutions (Williams & Ghanadan 2006). The power sector reform began in Chile in 1982 for the first time and then 
spread through various countries in the world especially after the 1990s. Therefore, last three decades have witnessed 
widespread power market reforms in both developed and developing countries that cost billions of dollars. Today, reforms 
are ongoing in many countries and reform process in the power sector is regarded as not only possible and necessary, but 
also inevitable. 
                                                 
* The author is a PhD candidate at Judge Business School and a member of Electricity Policy Research Group (EPRG) of 
University of Cambridge (UK). The present paper is one of three papers that constitute his PhD thesis. The views, findings 
and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and do not represent in any way the views of any 
institution he is affiliated with. 
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In all reforming countries (whether developed or developing), reforms take place in a political economic environment and 
are directly affected by the developments taking place in it. In most cases, political structure of a country largely 
determines the extent of the reforms in that country. In the United Kingdom, for example, privatization of state owned 
electricity utility reinforced the ideology of the Thatcher government and its interest in reducing the costs of domestic coal 
subsidies. Similar ideological and political explanations can be found from Norway to New Zealand (Hogan 2002). There 
is no doubt that without political support the reforms cannot go further in any country. This paper attempts to discover the 
impact of political economy variables on the liberalization process in electricity markets. 
 
We try to answer following research questions: (i) does domestic political structure of a country affect the reforms in its 
electricity market? (ii) does foreign influence resulting from the dependence on foreign financial support have an influence 
on the electricity market liberalization process? (iii) are government structure (single party or coalition government), 
political stability, economic policy orientation of the ruling party (left, center or right ideology), electoral system 
(presidential or majoritarian) and professional/educational background of the head of executive (prime minister, president 
and so on) important determinants of the reform progress? If yes, what is the direction of the influences originated from 
these variables?  
 
In general, societies with democratic political institutions tend to encourage a liberal economic system in which monopoly 
structure is not allowed in any sector, including power industry. Also, democratic countries support income equality as 
ruling parties try to increase the well-being of the masses in order to sustain their political support. This tendency is 
supposed to be stronger in countries with a lower rural population since people (meaning “voters”) living in urban areas 
are, in general, much more educated and politically organized than those living in countryside. Besides, in many cases, the 
most important beneficiaries (and therefore potential supporters) of the reform programs are large electricity consumers, 
among which industrial consumers are the most important ones. Increased efficiency and careful regulation in the sector 
transfer huge benefits to industrial consumers in the form of reduced electricity prices. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
that industry sector supports the reform initiatives in the power industry; and as its size gets bigger and bigger so does its 
influence. Taking into account all these cause-effect relations, we formulate our first hypothesis as follows:   
 
Hypothesis 1: Holding everything else constant, countries with a larger industry sector, a lower rural 
population, and a lower income inequality are more likely to liberalize their electricity industry. These 
effects are stronger in more democratic countries. 
 
In 1992, the World Bank officially changed its lending policy for electricity development from traditional project lending 
to policy lending. That is, any country borrowing from the Bank on power projects would have to agree to move away 
from a “single national electricity utility as a public monopoly” and adopt ownership, structural and regulatory reforms 
(Yi-chong 2006). Other international financial institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank have followed suit (Williams & Ghanadan 
2006). Today, the liberalization of the infrastructure (including electricity) industries is one of the preconditions of any 
financial support program. Therefore, our second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign financial aid and/or assistance make liberalization more likely. 
 
It is almost assumed to be common knowledge that left-wing governments oppose the practices of a liberal economic 
system (including electricity market reform) and that political stability originating from single-party governments or 
presidential systems enable the liberalization process to progress faster as they provide a stable political environment for 
the reforms. Therefore, our third hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Countries with right-wing (or center) governments are more likely to liberalize their 
electricity markets. Similarly, single-party governments (rather than coalition governments) and countries 
with presidential regimes (rather than parliamentary ones) are expected to liberalize more. Likewise, as the 
number of years the chief executive has been in office increases, so do reform progress. 
 
The prior knowledge or experience of the head of executive regarding the power market liberalization process may 
encourage (or discourage) the reform measures. Hence, our final hypothesis turns out to be: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Educational and professional backgrounds of head of executive branch (prime minister, 
president and so on) are important determinants of electricity market liberalization. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section provides a literature review regarding applied empirical studies focusing on 
the political economy of liberalization processes. Section 3 describes data. Section 4 summarizes the methodological 
framework. Following section presents empirical analysis and discusses the results. Section 6 mentions potential 
limitations of the study. The last section concludes. 
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2. Literature review 
 
Presenting an extensive literature review on political economy of economic reform is both outside the scope of this paper 
and not possible given limitations on the length of the study. Although there is some preliminary academic work that 
investigates the impact of political economy variables on electricity market reform outcome; to best of our knowledge, this 
study constitutes one of the first empirical applied investigations that focus on the possible implications of political 
economic environment for electricity market reform process. So, there is a real gap in the empirical literature with regard 
to the analysis of the possible repercussions of the political economy variables for the power market reforms. This is quite 
surprising given the economic importance of the sector both for individual countries and for the world economy in general, 
as well as the significant number of reform programs that have already initiated in many power sectors. 
 
In this section, we will mention only applied studies on the relationship between economic reform processes and political 
economy variables. The studies presenting an anecdotal discussion of the political economy of the various reform 
programs without any applied analysis are outside the scope of this section. Within this framework, we will concentrate on 
three groups of studies: (1) those providing applied evidence from power industry; (2) those on the political economy of 
reform process in telecommunications industry; (3) studies presenting the results of applied work from non-infrastructure 
industries. Table 1 presents details of the econometric studies mentioned here including hypotheses tested, dependent 
variables, explanatory variables, results, data and methodology. Table 2 classifies previous econometric studies by their 
focus. 
 
The first group of studies (those focusing on the political economy of electricity market reforms) include only two papers 
by Chang & Berdiev (2011) and Cubbin & Stern (2006). Chang & Berdiev (2011) examine the effect of government 
ideology, political factors and globalization on energy regulation in electricity and gas industries using the bias-corrected 
least square dummy variable model in a panel of 23 OECD countries over the period of 1975-2007. They find that left-
wing governments promote regulation in gas and electricity sectors; and less politically fragmented institutions contribute 
to deregulation of gas and electricity industries. Their results also suggest that long tenures of incumbent government have 
limited impact on regulation in electricity sector, while it is associated with an increase in regulation of gas sector. Further, 
they conclude that higher political constraints and more globalized countries lead to deregulation in electricity and gas 
sectors; and economic and social integration are the forces that promote deregulation in the gas industry, whereas political 
integration advances deregulation in the electricity industry. Cubbin & Stern (2006) assess whether a regulatory law and 
higher quality regulatory governance are associated with superior outcomes in the electricity industry. Their analysis, for 
28 developing economies over 1980–2001, draws on theoretical and empirical work on the impact of telecommunications 
regulators in developing economies. Their study show that, controlling for privatization and competition and allowing for 
country-specific fixed effects, both regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance are positively and significantly 
associated with higher per capita generation capacity. 
 
The studies providing applied evidence from telecommunications industry are Duso & Seldeslachts (2010), Gasmi et al. 
(2009), Gasmi & Recuero Virto (2010) and Li & Xu (2002). Duso & Seldeslachts (2010) empirically investigate the cross-
sectional and temporal variation in entry liberalization in the mobile telecom industries of OECD countries during the 
1990s. Their findings indicate that majoritarian electoral systems are important drivers for change, while independent 
industry regulators slow down such reforms. They conclude that powerful industry incumbents hold up the liberalization 
process and governing bodies that favour a small welfare state accelerate it. Taking the view that political accountability is 
a key factor linking political and regulatory structures and processes, Gasmi et al. (2009) empirically investigate its impact 
on the performance of regulation in telecommunications in time-series cross-sectional data sets for 29 developing and 23 
developed countries during 1985–99. They provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions 
and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. Their analysis finds that the impact of political accountability 
on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. The paper by Gasmi & Recuero Virto (2010) has two 
related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms 
of the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberalization, privatization, and the (re)structuring of 
regulation. Second, it attempts to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into actual deployment of 
telecommunications infrastructure. They conduct this simultaneous investigation by means of an econometric analysis of a 
1985-1999 time-series cross-sectional database on 86 developing countries. Their study finds that sectoral as well as 
institutional and financial factors are important determinants of the actual reforms implemented. They uncover that 
countries facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to introduce competition in the digital 
cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-line incumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors 
and governments. Finally, Li & Xu (2002) examine the political economy of privatization and liberalization in the 
telecommunications sector in recent decades. They find that countries with stronger pro-reform interest groups, namely the 
financial services sector and the urban consumers, are more likely to reform in more democratic countries. However, their 
result suggest that less democratic countries are more likely to maintain the public sector monopoly when the government 
benefits more from such a governance mode, e.g., when the fiscal deficit is higher. They conclude that democracy affects 
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the pace of reforms by magnifying the voices of interest groups in more democratic countries and by moderating 
politicians’ discretion in less democratic countries. 
 
The final group of studies presents the results of applied investigations from non-infrastructure industries. The examples 
from this group include Alesina et al. (2006), Boschini (2006), Dreher et al. (2009), Duval (2008), Fredriksson & 
Wollscheid (2008), Goldberg & Pavcnik (2005), Huang (2009), Ickes & Ofer (2006), Kim & Pirttilä (2006), Olper (2007), 
Volscho (2007) and Wagner et al. (2009). Here, we will briefly mention them while their details are presented in Table 1. 
 
Alesina et al. (2006) question why countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and inflation and 
what explains the timing of reforms. They find that stabilizations are more likely to occur during crisis, at the beginning of 
term of office of a new government, in countries with “strong” governments (i.e. presidential systems and unified 
governments with a large majority of the party in office), and when the executive faces less constraints. Boschini (2006) 
analyses how incentives under different sets of political institutions map into policies that promote industrialisation. The 
results show that a flat wealth distribution and skilled political elite enhance development the most in elitist regimes, while 
democracies perform as well as elitist regimes in terms of industrialization. Dreher et al. (2009) analyze whether the 
educational and professional background of a head of government matters for the implementation of market-liberalizing 
reforms. Their results show that reforms are more likely during the tenure of former entrepreneurs. Duval (2008) provides 
an empirical attempt to determine whether macroeconomic policies determined as a result of political processes influence 
reform patterns in labor and product markets. Fredriksson & Wollscheid (2008) seek to explain the implications of 
corruption and political instability for firm investment in abatement technology. Their results suggest that political 
instability raises abatement technology investment. Goldberg & Pavcnik (2005) exploit drastic trade liberalizations in 
Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the relationship between protection and industry wage premiums. Huang 
(2009) focuses on the forces that induce governments to undertake financial sector reform. Ickes & Ofer examine changes 
in the industrial structure of employment across Russian regions and assess the importance of legacy factors, political 
factors, and success factors in explaining this process. They find that initial conditions such as natural resource potential, 
climate, and industrial specialization explain more of the variation in industrial restructuring than political variables. Using 
data from transition economies, Kim & Pirttilä (2006) examine linkages between political constraints and economic 
reforms. Their results suggest that progress in reform is positively associated with public support for reforms, which is 
affected by income inequality and expected individual performance during future reforms. They also find evidence to 
support reform sequencing starting with a reform that is both popular and stimulatory to other reforms. Olper (2007) 
presents an empirical investigation of how agricultural land ownership inequality and government ideology (right-wing vs. 
left-wing) affect agricultural protection. Their data show, overall, that protection is decreasing in land inequality and with 
left-wing government orientation, but not in a linear fashion: left-wing governments tend to support agriculture in more 
unequal societies. Using data on 160 US metropolitan statistical areas from the 2000 census, Volscho (2007) examines 
how quintile shares of size-adjusted family income are impacted by union density and federal, state, and local government 
employment. Finally, Wagner et al. (2009) analyze how institutional factors affect satisfaction with democracy. They find 
that high-quality institutions like the rule of law, well-functioning regulation, low corruption, and other institutions that 
improve resource allocation have a positive effect on average satisfaction with democracy. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of previous applied econometric studies adopting a political economy approach 
 
Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
Alesina et al. (2006) H: It is easier to stabilize an 
economy more decisively in 
times of crisis than in times of 
more “moderate” economic 
problems 
- Deficit/GDP ratio 
- Inflation rate 
- Number of executive 
constraints 
- Election year 
- Political orientation of the 
ruling government 
- Assembly or parliamentary 
system 
- Executive control of absolute 
majority 
- Number of years left in the 
current term for the executive 
- Total government deficit as a 
share of GDP and inflation 
- The real per capita GDP  
- The ratio of exports plus 
imports to GDP 
- The dummy taking value 1 if 
the country is currently in crisis 
- Countries’ participation to IMF 
programs 
- Stabilizations are more likely 
to occur when time of crisis 
occur, at the beginning of term 
of office of a new government, 
in countries with “strong” 
governments (i.e. presidential 
systems and unified 
governments with a large 
majority of the party in office), 
and when the executive faces 
less constraints 
- The role of external 
inducements like IMF programs 
has at best a weak effect 
Data: 
- Yearly data on a large 
sample of developed and 
developing countries 
covering from 1960 to 
2003 
- Source(s): Polity IV 
project, World Bank's 
Database of Political 
Institutions, IMF's 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database, 
Penn World Table 
Methodology: 
- OLS 
Boschini (2006) H-1: The skills of the political 
elite and political institutions 
play a crucial role for 
industrialization to occur 
H-2: The government 
(controlled by elite or through 
a pivotal voter) must have the 
ability as well as the incentives 
to promote the 
industrialization process 
- Industrialization index 
- GDP growth 1820-1913 
 
- Political regime 
- Enrolment in primary 
education 
- Index of the favorableness of 
attitudes toward 
entrepreneurship 
- Index of concentration in 
landholdings 
 
- A flat wealth distribution and 
skilled political elite enhance 
development the most in elitist 
regimes, while democracies 
perform as well as elitist 
regimes in terms of 
industrialization 
 
Data: 
- 23 countries from 1820 
to 1913 
- Source(s): Comparative 
Patterns of Economic 
Development 1850–1914, 
John Hopkins University 
Methodology: 
- Partial sums of squares 
Chang & Berdiev 
(2011) 
H: Government ideology, 
political factors and 
globalization are crucial for 
energy regulation in electricity 
and gas industries 
 
- The growth rate of 
regulation indicator in 
energy industry 
- Government ideology 
- Herfindahl index to proxy for 
government fragmentation 
- Number of years that the 
incumbent government has been 
in office 
- Left-wing governments 
promote regulation in gas and 
electricity sectors 
- Less politically fragmented 
institutions contribute to 
deregulation of gas and 
Data: 
- 23 OECD countries 
over the period of 1975-
2007 
- Source(s): Conway and 
Nicoletti (2006), Potrafke 
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Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
 
 
 
 
- Index of political constraints 
- Globalization index 
- Energy demand 
- Real GDP per capita (constant 
in 2000) 
electricity industries 
- Long tenures of incumbent 
government have limited impact 
on regulation in electricity 
sector, while it is associated 
with an increase in regulation of 
gas sector 
- Higher political constraints and 
more globalized countries lead 
to deregulation in electricity and 
gas sectors 
- Economic and social 
integration are the forces that 
promote deregulation in the gas 
industry, whereas political 
integration advance deregulation 
in the electricity industry 
(2009), Beck et al. 
(2001), Henisz (2000), 
World Bank, BP 
Methodology: 
- The bias-corrected least 
square dummy variable 
model 
 
Cubbin & Stern 
(2006) 
H: A regulatory law and 
higher quality regulatory 
governance are associated with 
superior outcomes in the 
electricity industry 
- Per capita generation 
capacity 
- Electricity (or energy) 
regulatory law 
- Autonomous or ministry 
regulator 
- License fee or government 
budget regulatory funding 
- Free or mandatory civil service 
pay scales for regulatory staff  
- Real GDP per capita 
- Debt payments as a proportion 
of national income 
- Industry value added as 
proportion of GDP 
- Controlling for privatization 
and competition and allowing 
for country-specific fixed 
effects, both regulatory law and 
higher quality regulatory 
governance are positively and 
significantly associated with 
higher per capita generation 
capacity 
Data: 
- 28 developing 
economies over 1980-
2001 
- Source(s): U.S. Energy 
Information Agency, 
World Bank 
Methodology: 
- Panel data modelling, 
error correction models 
Dreher et al. (2009) H: The educational and 
professional background of a 
head of government matters 
for the implementation of 
market-liberalizing reforms 
- Composite index of 
economic freedom 
- Size of government 
index 
- Legal structure and 
security of property rights 
index 
- Access to sound money 
- Profession of heads of 
governments 
- Education of heads of 
governments 
- Economic freedom 
- Economic growth 
- Civil liberties 
- Aid 
- Reforms are more likely during 
the tenure of former 
entrepreneurs 
- Entrepreneurs belonging to a 
left-wing party are more 
successful in inducing reforms 
than a member of a right-wing 
party with the same previous 
Data: 
- Panel data over the 
period 1970–2002 
- Profession and 
education of more than 
500 political leaders from 
72 countries 
- Source(s): Gwartney 
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Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
index 
- Exchange with 
foreigners index 
- Regulation of credit, 
labor and business index 
- Linguistic fractionalization 
- Currency crises 
- Government fractionalization 
- Coalition government 
- Direct presidential 
- Veto players drop 
profession 
- Former professional scientists 
also promote reforms, the more 
so, the longer they stay in office 
- The impact of politicians’ 
education is not robust and 
depends on the method of 
estimation 
and Lawson (2004), 
World Bank, Alesina et 
al. (2003), Freedom 
House, Beck et al. 
(2001), Dreher (2006) 
Methodology: 
- Pooled time-series 
cross-section (panel data) 
regressions 
- Feasible generalized 
least squares 
Duso & Seldeslachts 
(2010) 
H: Differences in political, 
government and regulatory 
environments explain the 
differing speed of reforms in 
the mobile telecom industries 
at the beginning of the 1990s 
- Degree of liberalization 
in the digital mobile 
industry 
- Share of incumbent operator in 
long-distance telecom 
- Annual revenues in the mobile 
telecommunications industry 
- Dummy variables for 
regulatory independence 
- Number of parties in the 
opposition 
- Percentage seats in the 
legislature held by government 
parties 
- Government’s programmatic 
position: Pro market regulations 
- Government’s programmatic 
position: Pro welfare state 
limitation 
- Population 
- Share of active population aged 
between 15 and 64 years 
- Annual income per capita  
- Majoritarian electoral systems 
are important drivers for change, 
while independent industry 
regulators slow down the 
reforms 
- Powerful industry incumbents 
hold up the liberalization 
process and governing bodies 
that favour a small welfare state 
accelerate it 
Data: 
- 24 OECD countries  
- Source(s): OECD 
regulation database, 
Persson and Tabellini 
(1999), Woldendorp et al. 
(1998), Budge et al. 
(2001), Lijphart (1999) 
Methodology: 
- Ordered probit model 
with country random-
effects 
Duval (2008) H: Macroeconomic policies 
and ideology influence reform 
patterns in labour and product 
markets 
- Policy index - Unemployment 
- Output gap 
- Crisis years 
- Small country 
- Ideology 
- Fractionalisation 
- Degree of sustainability of 
- Sound public finances and 
fiscal expansions help foster 
reforms 
- The effect of fiscal expansion 
may also be greater for countries 
that pursue fixed exchange-rate 
regimes 
Data: 
- 21 OECD countries 
over the period 1985–
2003 
- Source(s): OECD 
Methodology: 
- Multivariate probit and 
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Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
public debt 
- Fiscal consolidation 
- Fiscal expansion 
 linear econometric 
models 
Fredriksson & 
Wollscheid (2008) 
H: Corruption and political 
instability are important 
determinants of firm 
investment in pollution control 
technology 
- Level of investment in 
clean technology in the 
steel industry 
- The respect that institutions 
and citizens use to govern their 
interactions 
- The degree to which business 
transactions involve corruption 
- The perception of the quality of 
public service provision 
- Political instability 
- Social and Institutional 
Capacity index 
- The size of the steel market 
- Per capita steel production 
- Total steel exported as a 
percentage of total steel 
produced 
- Total trade as a share of GDP 
- Gastil index 
- Government commitment 
- Per capita gross domestic 
product 
- Greater corruptibility increases 
the level of abatement 
technology investment because 
the strategic incentive to 
underinvest in pollution control 
technology declines when 
policymakers become more 
corruptible 
- Political instability raises 
abatement technology 
investment 
Data: 
- Steel-sector panel data 
from 41 countries for the 
years 1992–1998 
- Source(s): International 
Iron and Steel Institute, 
Kaufman et al. (1999), 
Banks (1995), CIESIN of 
Columbia University, 
Freedom House, World 
Bank 
Methodology: 
- Panel data estimation 
(fixed and random effects 
models) 
Gasmi et al. (2009) H: There ia a strong 
relationship between the 
quality of political institutions 
and the performance of 
regulation in 
telecommunications sector 
- Mainline coverage 
- Cellular subscription 
- Mainlines per employee 
- Price of monthly 
subscript to fixed-line 
service 
- Price of cellular service 
- Regulatory governance index 
- Corruption 
- Bureaucracy 
- Law and order 
- Expropriation 
- Currency risk 
- Institutional environment index 
- Checks and balances 
- Privatization 
- Competition in fixed 
- Competition in cellular 
- Rural population 
- Population density 
- The impact of political 
accountability on the 
performance of regulation is 
stronger in developing countries 
- Future reforms in these 
countries should give due 
attention to the development of 
politically accountable systems 
Data: 
- Panel data for 29 
developing countries and 
23 developed countries 
during 1985–99 
- Source(s): Gasmi, 
Noumba, and Recuero 
Virto (2006) 
Methodology: 
- Differenced generalized 
method-of-moments 
estimation 
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Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
Gasmi & Recuero 
Virto (2010) 
H: Sectoral, institutional and 
financial factors are important 
determinants of the reforms 
implemented in 
telecommunication industry 
- Fixed-line deployment 
- Cellular competition 
(analogue) 
- Counter (analogue) 
- Cellular competition 
(digital) 
- Counter (digital) 
- Fixed-line competition 
(local) 
- Separate regulator 
- Privatization 
- Corruption 
- Institutional index 
- Democracy index 
- Risk index 
- Total debt service 
- Net taxes on products 
- Aid per capita 
- Population density 
- Rural population 
- Imports 
- Telecommunications staff 
- Checks and balances 
- English legal origin 
- French legal origin 
- Share of protestant (1980) 
- Latitude 
- Average schooling years 
(1980) 
- Ethno linguistic 
fractionalization 
- Africa 
- Crop and forest land 
- Political constraints 
- Free press 
- Ethnic tensions 
- Law and order  
- Sectoral as well as institutional 
and financial factors are found 
to be important determinants of 
the actual reforms implemented 
- There is a positive relationship 
between the decision to 
introduce competition in the 
digital cellular segment and the 
growth of the fixed line segment 
- Countries facing increasing 
institutional risk and financial 
constraints are more likely to 
introduce competition in the 
digital cellular segment and to 
privatize the fixed-line 
incumbent 
- Competition in the analogue 
cellular segment and the 
creation of a separate regulator 
seem to be relatively less 
attractive policies 
Data: 
- 1985-1999 panel data 
on 86 developing 
countries 
- Source(s): Available 
from the authors upon 
request 
Methodology: 
- Duration methodology 
- System Generalized 
Method of Moments 
(SYS-GMM) 
Goldberg & Pavcnik 
(2005) 
H: Worker industry affiliation 
plays a crucial role in how 
trade policy affects wages in 
many trade models 
- Wage differentials - Worker characteristics 
- Occupation indicators 
- Job type indicators 
- Place of work characteristics 
 
- Without industry fixed effects, 
workers in protected sectors 
earn less than workers with 
similar observable 
characteristics in unprotected 
sectors 
- Allowing for industry fixed 
effects reverses the result: trade 
protection increases relative 
wages 
- Because tariff reductions were 
proportionately larger in sectors 
Data: 
- Data on 21 industries of 
Colombia 
- Source(s): Colombian 
National Planning 
Department 
Methodology: 
- 2SLS 
- OLS 
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Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
employing a high fraction of 
less-skilled workers, the 
decrease in the wage premiums 
in these sectors affected such 
workers disproportionately 
Huang (2009) H-1: Political structure of a 
country has a substantial 
influence on policy change in 
financial sector 
H-2: Policy change in a 
country is positively correlated 
with the initial level of 
liberalization 
- Level of financial 
liberalization 
- Balance of payments crisis 
- Banking crisis 
- Recession 
- High inflation 
- Drastic political change 
- Political orientation of ruling 
party 
- IMF program 
- Democracy 
 
- Policy change in a country is 
negatively rather than positively 
associated with the initial extent 
of liberalization level, and the 
distance behind the regional 
leader 
- Countries with highly 
repressed financial sectors have 
more potential to embark on 
reform, while countries with a 
highly liberalized financial 
sector have greater status quo 
bias 
- Economic and political 
structure and ideology can have 
a substantial influence on policy 
change, and the extent of 
democracy has a significantly 
negative effect on policy reform 
Data: 
- 35 countries for the 
period 1973–1996 
- Source(s): IMF, World 
Bank, Polity IV project  
Methodology: 
- Common correlated 
effect pooled (CCEP) 
modeling 
Ickes & Ofer (2006) H: Changes in the industrial 
structure of employment 
across Russian regions are 
mainly determined by legacy 
factors, political factors, and 
success factors 
- Structural change in 
industry 
- The natural resource potential 
- The initial employment share 
- The rate of urbanization 
- The specialization of industry 
- Average January (1997) 
temperature 
- Change in population 
- Change in the number of 
employed 
- Change in the number of small 
enterprises 
- Change in gross regional 
product per capita 
- FDI per 1000 employed 
- Initial conditions such as 
natural resource potential, 
climate, and industrial 
specialization explain more of 
the variation in industrial 
restructuring than political 
variables 
Data: 
- Data on various 
industrial sectors of 
Russia during 1990s 
- Source(s): CEFIR 
database, RSS, Russian 
Statistical Office, World 
Bank 
Methodology: 
- OLS 
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Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
- Change in the crime rate 
- Democracy index 
- Legislative quality 
- Political environment 
- Social environment 
Kim & Pirttilä (2006) H: Both ex post and ex ante 
political constraints are 
instrumental in determining 
the extent of progress in 
welfare-enhancing reforms 
- Liberalization index - Support for reforms 
- Inflation rate 
- unemployment rate 
- GDP growth 
- Gini coefficient 
- Government’s budget balance 
- Capital formation 
- Future loss 
- Index of political freedom 
- Progress in reform is positively 
associated with public support 
for reforms, which is affected by 
income inequality and expected 
individual performance during 
future reforms 
- Reform sequencing should 
start with a reform that is both 
popular and stimulatory to other 
reforms 
Data: 
- 14 transition countries 
for 1990-97 period 
- Source(s): EBRD, 
United Nations 
University, World 
Institute for Development 
Economics Research 
Methodology: 
- Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) 
- 2SLS 
- Static fixed effects 
- Dynamic fixed effects 
Li & Xu (2002) H-1: Countries with a larger 
financial sector, a higher urban 
population, and a lower 
income inequality are more 
likely to privatize and 
liberalize 
H-2: A higher government 
budget deficit makes 
privatization and liberalization 
less likely, while a larger 
government debt has the 
opposite implications 
H-3: Countries with a right-of-
center government and 
countries that receive World 
Bank assistance in the 
telecommunications sector are 
more likely to privatize and 
liberalize 
- Non-state ownership of 
telecommunications 
sector 
- Urban/total population 
- Gini coefficient 
- Financial depth 
- Deficit/GDP 
- Profitability 
- Ideology 
- World Bank project 
- Democracy 
- Party polarization 
- Number of veto players 
- The number of main lines per 
100 inhabitants 
- Real GDP per capita 
- Illiteracy rate 
- The ratio of manufacturing 
value added over GDP 
- The share of population in the 
largest city 
- The share of government debt 
- Countries with stronger pro-
reform interest groups, namely 
the financial services sector and 
the urban consumers, are more 
likely to reform in more 
democratic countries 
- Less democratic countries are 
more likely to maintain the 
public sector monopoly when 
the government benefits more 
from such a governance mode 
- Democracy affects the pace of 
reforms by magnifying the 
voices of interest groups in more 
democratic countries and by 
moderating politicians’ 
discretion in less democratic 
countries 
Data: 
- 50 countries over the 
period from 1990 to 1998 
- Source(s): World Bank, 
Gurr (1999) 
Methodology: 
- Fixed/random effects 
models 
- OLS 
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Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
in GDP 
Olper (2007) H-1: Agricultural protection is 
influenced directly by land 
inequality and ideology 
H-2: The effect of land 
inequality is conditional to the 
ideological orientation of the 
government 
- Aggregated producer 
subsidy equivalent 
- Land inequality (land gini) 
- Ideological orientation of the 
government 
- Amount of agricultural land 
per capita 
- Share of agricultural export to 
total export 
- Agricultural share in 
employment and in GDP 
- Gastil index of political rights 
- Index of quality of institution 
- Protection is decreasing in land 
inequality and with left-wing 
government orientation, but not 
in a linear fashion: left-wing 
governments tend to support 
agriculture in more unequal 
societies 
- The relationship holds better in 
democracies than in 
dictatorships 
 
Data: 
- 40 countries for 1982-
2000 period 
- Source(s): IFAD, 
Keefer and Knack (1995), 
FAO, Database on 
Political Institutions, 
OECD, USDA, World 
Bank, Freedom House, 
International Country 
Risk Guide 
Methodology: 
- OLS 
Volscho (2007) H: Quintile shares of size-
adjusted family income are 
impacted by union density and 
federal, state, and local 
government employment 
- Family income - Union density 
- Federal government 
employment 
- State government employment 
- Local government employment 
- Mean establishment size 
- Manufacturing employment 
- Unemployment rate 
- Percent foreign born 
- Female labor force 
participation 
- Female-headed families 
- Dispersion in education 
- Percent college educated 
- Dispersion in age 
- Union density has a 
progressive effect that benefits 
middle and upper-middle 
income families 
- Federal government 
employment has a strong 
progressive effect on the entire 
income distribution 
- State government employment 
has a progressive effect on 
middle and upper-middle 
income families 
- Local government employment 
mainly impacts families in the 
bottom forty percent of the 
income distribution 
Data: 
- Data on 160 US 
metropolitan statistical 
areas from the 2000 
census 
- Source(s): USA 2000 
Census Data 
Methodology: 
- Seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation 
(SURE) 
Wagner et al. (2009) H: Institutional factors affect 
satisfaction with democracy 
- Average yearly 
satisfaction with 
democracy 
- Inflation 
- GDP per capita 
- Growth in GDP 
- Unemployment rate 
- BERI composite index 
- Quality of monetary policy 
- Regulatory quality 
- Rule of law 
- High-quality institutions like 
the rule of law, well-functioning 
regulation, low corruption, and 
other institutions that improve 
resource allocation have a 
positive effect on average 
satisfaction with democracy 
Data: 
- A panel of observations 
from Eurobarometers in 
the time span 1990–2000 
- Source(s): Business 
Environment Risk 
Intelligence (BERI), 
Database of political 
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Study Hypothesis (H) Dependent Variable(s) 
Explanatory 
Variable(s) Result(s) Data & Methodology 
- Control of corruption 
- Size of the shadow economy 
- Checks and balances 
- Left/right placement 
- Inequality 
institutions (DPI), 
Eurobarometer 
Methodology: 
- Random effects panel 
regressions 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of previous econometric studies by their focus 
 
Focus of the study Major Variable(s) Primary Data Sources Examples 
Political economy of 
liberalization in electricity 
industry 
- Regulation indicator in power industry 
- Government ideology 
- Government fragmentation 
- Number of years that the incumbent 
government has been in office 
- Index of political constraints 
- Globalization index 
- Energy demand 
- Real GDP per capita 
- Per capita generation capacity 
- Debt payments as a proportion of national 
income 
- Industry value added as proportion of GDP 
- World Bank 
- U.S. Energy Information Agency 
- BP 
Chang & Berdiev (2011), Cubbin & 
Stern (2006) 
Political economy of 
liberalization in 
telecommunications industry 
- Degree of liberalization 
- Share of incumbent operator 
- Regulatory independence 
- Government’s programmatic position 
- Share of population aged between 15-64 years 
- Mainline coverage & cellular subscription 
- Mainlines per employee 
- Price of fixed-line, cellular services 
- Regulatory governance index 
- Corruption 
- Bureaucracy 
- Law and order 
- OECD regulation database 
- World Bank 
Duso & Seldeslachts (2010), Gasmi et 
al. (2009), Gasmi & Recuero Virto 
(2010), Li & Xu (2002) 
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Focus of the study Major Variable(s) Primary Data Sources Examples 
- Expropriation 
- Currency risk 
- Institutional environment index 
- Checks and balances 
- Privatization 
- Competition in fixed and cellular 
- Democracy index 
- Total debt service 
- Aid per capita 
- Ethno linguistic fractionalization 
- Free press 
- Ownership of telecommunications sector 
- Urban/total population 
- Gini coefficient 
- Financial depth 
- Deficit/GDP 
- World Bank project 
- Real GDP per capita 
Political economy of economic 
reforms in non-infrastructure 
industries and other areas 
- Deficit/GDP ratio 
- Inflation rate 
- Number of executive constraints 
- Election year 
- Political orientation of the ruling government 
- Assembly or parliamentary system 
- Executive control of absolute majority 
- Number of years left in the current term for 
the executive 
- Total government deficit as a share of GDP 
and inflation 
- The real per capita GDP  
- The ratio of exports plus imports to GDP 
- Crisis years 
- Countries’ participation to IMF programs 
- Industrialization index 
- Index of the favorableness of attitudes toward 
entrepreneurship 
- Index of concentration in landholdings 
- Size of government index 
- Legal structure and security of property rights 
- Polity IV project 
- World Bank's Database of Political 
Institutions 
- IMF's International Financial Statistics 
(IFS) database 
- Penn World Table 
- Freedom House 
- OECD 
- National Statistical Offices 
- EBRD 
- United Nations University 
- World Institute for Development Economics 
Research 
- International Country Risk Guide 
- Business Environment Risk Intelligence 
(BERI) 
- Eurobarometer 
Alesina et al. (2006), Boschini (2006), 
Dreher et al. (2009), Duval (2008), 
Fredriksson & Wollscheid (2008), 
Goldberg & Pavcnik (2005), Huang 
(2009), Ickes & Ofer (2006), Kim & 
Pirttilä (2006), Olper (2007), Volscho 
(2007), Wagner et al. (2009) 
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Focus of the study Major Variable(s) Primary Data Sources Examples 
index 
- Regulation of credit, labor and business index 
- Profession of heads of governments 
- Education of heads of governments 
- Aid 
- Degree of sustainability of public debt 
- The degree to which business transactions 
involve corruption 
- The perception of the quality of public service 
- Political instability 
- Level of financial liberalization 
- The rate of urbanization 
- Support for reforms 
- Gini coefficient 
- Satisfaction with democracy 
 
3. Overview of data 
 
Our data set is based on a panel of 55 countries for a period beginning in 1975 and extending through 2010. List of 
countries in our data set is available in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Years 1975 and 2010 represent, respectively, the earliest and 
the last year for which data are available at the time the research is conducted. The countries in our sample are determined 
by data availability, especially by data on electricity market reform indicators. In our study, the total number of maximum 
observations for each variable is 1,540. Because of the missing observations, our panel is unbalanced. 
 
The variables used in the study are entry barriers, public ownership and vertical integration in electricity market; overall 
electricity market closeness index; industry value added (% of GDP); rural population (% of total population); gini 
coefficient; polity score (-10,+10); net official development assistance and official aid received (current billion US$); party 
structure (single-party or coalition); the years the chief executive has been in office; party orientation with respect to 
economic policy (right, left or center); electoral system (parliamentary or presidential regime); professional background of 
head of executive (entrepreneur, scientist (economist), military, politician, scientist (other) or unknown/other); educational 
background of head of executive (economics, natural science, other university or unknown/other); dummy variables 
representing EU members, OECD members or the existence of electricity market reform idea; population density (people 
per square km of land area); electricity consumption (MWh per capita); GDP per capita (PPP, current thousand 
international $); average number of years of adult (15+) education; imports of goods and services as % of GDP. Table 3 
shows descriptive statistics of the variables in our analysis. 
 
Data on overall electricity market reform index are obtained from Conway and Nicolett (2006) and EBRD2 (2011). 
Conway and Nicolett (2006) provide data for 30 OECD countries. They also provide data on sub indicators of reform 
process; namely entry barriers, public ownership and vertical integration. The index ranges from 0 to 6 where 0 represents 
the fully open market in which entry barriers, public ownership and vertical integration are minimized and a score of 6 is 
given to a closed market. EBRD (2011) provides a similar indicator for additional 25 developing countries where EBRD 
operates. The data from EBRD (2011) are available on a 1-4 scale. To establish uniformity between two data sets, the data 
from EBRD (2011) are converted into 6-0 scale. Figure 1 and Figure 2 provide the change in electricity market closeness 
index from 1989 to 2007 for the countries in our dataset. 
 
The data regarding industry value added as % of GDP, rural population as % of total population and net official 
development assistance and official aid received in current billion US$ are taken from World Bank (2011). Gini 
coefficient3 and polity score data come from UNU-WIDER (2011) and Center for Systemic Peace (2010), respectively. 
Figure 3 shows histograms of industry value added, rural population and polity score variables. Figure 4 presents total 
development assistance and aid received between 1990 and 2007. Countries that did not receive any aid or assistance 
during this period are excluded from Figure 4. Gini coefficient scores of countries in 1995 and 2005 are provided by Figure 
5. Data on political economy variables (party structure, the years the chief executive has been in office, party orientation of 
head of executive, party orientation with respect to economic policy, electoral system) originate from Keefer (2010). 
Figure 6 shows the share of electoral systems in our sample countries as of 2007. Professional and educational background 
of head of executive data are partly collected by the author and partly provided by Dreher et al. (2009). 
 
Dummy variables representing being an EU member, an OECD member and the existence of electricity market reform idea 
are constructed by the author. The dummy variable for the existence of electricity market reform idea takes the value 1 
after 1989 when the electricity market reform was implemented, for the first time, in a full scale in a developed country 
(i.e. the UK); the years before 1989 take the value 0.   
 
World Bank (2011) provides data on population density (people per sq. km of land area), electricity consumption (MWh 
per capita), GDP per capita (PPP, current thousand int. $) and imports of goods and services as % of GDP. Average 
number of years of adult (15+) education is taken from Barro & Lee (2010). The data from Barro & Lee (2010) are 
available with 5-year intervals; to ensure conformity with other data, we converted them into yearly data by linear 
interpolation. Figure 7 presents adult education data for 1990 and 2007.   
 
                                                 
2 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
3 The Gini coefficient is a measure of the inequality of a distribution, a value of 0 expressing total equality and a value of 1 
maximal inequality. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variables in the models 
 
Variables (units) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # of Obser. 
# of 
Countries 
Dependent Variables       
Entry barriers in electricity market (0-6) 4.59 2.26 0 6 990 30 
Public ownership in electricity market (0-6) 4.56 1.80 0 6 990 30 
Vertical integration in electricity market (0-6) 4.65 2.03 0 6 990 30 
Overall electricity market closeness index (0-6) 4.46 1.61 0 6 1,540 55 
Explanatory Variables       
Industry value added (% of GDP) 32.39 7.43 10.29 69.92 1,415 55 
Rural population (% of total population) 33.95 14.47 2.66 73.60 1,514 55 
Gini coefficient (0-100) 30.43 6.75 16.63 57.40 760 54 
Polity score (-10,+10) 6.31 6.13 -10 10 1,357 53 
Net official development assistance and official aid 
received (current billion US$) 0.11 0.28 -0.46 3.79 1,408 55 
Party Structure (1: single-party, 0: coalition) 0.46 0.50 0 1 1,493 53 
The years the chief executive has been in office 4.35 3.84 1 35 1,437 54 
Party orientation with respect to economic policy: Right 0.40 0.49 0 1 1,218 51 
Party orientation with respect to economic policy: Left 0.44 0.50 0 1 1,218 51 
Party orientation with respect to economic policy: Center 0.15 0.36 0 1 1,218 51 
Electoral system (parliamentary regimes) 0.68 0.47 0 1 1,475 55 
Professional background of head of executive: 
Entrepreneur 0.06 0.24 0 1 1,429 54 
Professional background of head of executive: Scientist 
(Economist) 0.04 0.21 0 1 1,429 54 
Professional background of head of executive: Military 0.07 0.25 0 1 1,429 54 
Professional background of head of executive: Politician 0.63 0.48 0 1 1,429 54 
Professional background of head of executive: Scientist 
(Other) 0.27 0.45 0 1 1,429 54 
Professional background of head of executive: 
Unknown/other 0.37 0.48 0 1 1,429 54 
Educational background of head of executive: Economics 0.25 0.43 0 1 1,429 54 
Educational background of head of executive: Natural 
science 0.18 0.38 0 1 1,429 54 
Educational background of head of executive: Other 
university 0.47 0.50 0 1 1,429 54 
Educational background of head of executive: 
Unknown/other 0.14 0.35 0 1 1,429 54 
Control Variables       
EU member (0-1) 0.30 0.46 0 1 1,540 55 
OECD member (0-1) 0.56 0.50 0 1 1,540 55 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.73 0.45 0 1 1,540 55 
Population density 
(people per sq. km of land area) 101.26 104.35 1.40 499.96 1,428 55 
Log of population density 4.00 1.34 0.33 6.21 1,428 55 
Electricity consumption (MWh per capita) 5.90 4.99 0.34 36.85 1,450 54 
Log of electricity consumption 1.47 0.80 -1.07 3.61 1,450 54 
GDP per capita (PPP, current thousand int. $) 14.34 10.83 0.73 84.41 1,307 55 
Log of GDP per capita 2.32 0.92 -0.32 4.44 1,307 55 
Average number of years of education received by people 
ages 15 and older 9.27 1.68 2.92 12.75 1,364 47 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 41.33 21.00 5.88 143.72 1,427 55 
Log of imports of goods and services 3.59 0.53 1.77 4.97 1,427 55 
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Figure 1. Electricity market closeness index in OECD countries (1989, 2007) 
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Figure 2. Electricity market closeness index in countries where EBRD operates (1989, 2007) 
 
 
20 
 
Figure 3. Histograms of industry value added, rural population and polity score variables 
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Figure 4. Total development assistance and aid received, 1990-2007 
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Figure 5. Gini coefficients (1995, 2005) 
 
 
Figure 6. Electoral systems in 2007 
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Figure 7. Adult education (1990, 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
As underlined by Jamasb et al. (2004), there is a lack of generally accepted and measured indicators for monitoring the 
progress, impacts, and performance of electricity sector reforms. Since the aim of this paper is to propose a framework for 
analyzing the power market reforms from a political economy perspective, we face with the same problem. That is, we 
need to, first, evaluate possible impact of political economic environment of a country on electricity market reform process 
in that country; second, decide which indicators to use in our study and; finally, specify methods to measure them. Let me 
focus on these tasks one by one. 
 
To best of our knowledge, no applied study has been done so far on the relationship between political economy and power 
market reform. Therefore, we cannot find empirical evidence in the applied literature concerning the direction of this 
relationship. To carry out our analysis, we need to decide which indicators to be used in the study. Since we are interested 
in the impact of political economy variables on power market reform process, we need variables representing political 
economic environment of a country and those representing the scale and intensity of the reform process. In addition to 
these variables, we also utilize a set of control variables which are assumed to be endogenous to reform process and 
explain a portion of the variations in reform progress. Another challenge we face in this study relates to the measurement 
of the variables. For an indicator to be useful it needs to be based on a clear definition and to be measurable. This is equally 
important whether it is expressed in physical, monetary or qualitative terms. In fact, most of the economic and industry 
indicators in our study are measured in some form of monetary or physical unit; and therefore, easy to include into the 
study. However, the extent and scope of electricity reforms are not quantifiable in physical or monetary units. The main 
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electricity reform measures, such as privatization, unbundling of functions, wholesale markets and independent regulation, 
are generally established gradually and have a qualitative dimension. Accounting for these measures with the use of 
dummy variables, as sometimes done, does not reflect extent or intensity. To overcome this problem, we used electricity 
market reform indicators constructed by international organizations (namely, OECD and EBRD). 
 
It is almost impossible to observe the real impact of political economy variables on electricity market reform process 
without separating the effects of market reform from other country specific features. Therefore, we specify our dependent 
variables (that is, reform indicators) as a function of (i) political economy variables (comparable cross-country indicators), 
(ii) a set of controls (being an EU or OECD member, existence of electricity market reform idea, population density, 
electricity consumption per capita, GDP per capita, average number of years of adult (25+) education, imports of goods 
and services as % of GDP), (iii) country-specific effects (these are assumed to be exogenous and to exist independently of 
reform process, but may explain a portion of the variation in reform progress) and (iv) other unobserved variables that 
influence the reform process. These variables are then used in panel regressions to assess their impact on variables we are 
interested in. In panel regressions, the exploitation of both cross-country and time-series dimensions of the data allows for 
control of country-specific effects. Apart from political economy variables; power market reform in a specific country and 
year may be influenced by being an EU or OECD member, existence of electricity market reform idea, population density, 
electricity consumption per capita, GDP per capita, average number of years of adult (15+) education and imports of goods 
and services as % of GDP. In our models, we include all these control variables in order to isolate the effect of political 
economy variables on the reform process. 
 
In this paper, we formulate regression equations as below. 
 1
2 1
k s
it j jit p pi it
j p
Y X Z tβ β γ δ ε
= =
= + + + +∑ ∑  (1) 
In the model, i and t represent unit of observation and time period, respectively. j and p are indices used to differentiate 
between observed and unobserved variables. Xji and Zpi represent observed and unobserved variables, respectively. Xji 
includes both political economy variables and control variables. Yit is dependent variable (that is, electricity market reform 
indicators). itε is the disturbance term and t is time trend term. Because the Zpi variables are unobserved, there is no means 
of obtaining information about the p piZγ∑ component of the model. For convenience, we define a term iα , known as 
the unobserved effect, representing the joint impact of the Zpi variables on Yit. So, our model may be rewritten as follows: 
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Now, the characterization of the iα  component is crucially important in the analysis. If control variables are so 
comprehensive that they capture all relevant characteristics of the individual, there will be no relevant unobserved 
characteristics. In that case, the iα  term may be dropped and pooled data regression (OLS) may be used to fit the model, 
treating all the observations for all time periods as a single sample. However, since we are not sure whether control 
variables in our models capture all relevant characteristics of the countries, we cannot directly carry out a pooled data 
regression of Y on X. If we were to do so, it would generate an omitted variable bias. Therefore we prefer to use either a 
Fixed Effects (FE) or Random Effects (RE) regression. In FE model, the country-specific effects ( iα ) are assumed to be 
the fixed parameters to be estimated. In RE model, the country-specific effects ( iα ) are treated as stochastic. The fixed 
effect model produces consistent estimates, while the estimates obtained from the random effect model will be more 
efficient. There are more than 90 countries in the world where a reform process has been initiated so far but data is 
available only for 55 countries. That is, our sample is limited by data availability. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether the 
observations in our model may be described as being a random sample from a given population; and cannot directly decide 
which regression specification (FE, RE or OLS) to use. It will be decided in the course of the analysis based on Hausman 
test and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier (BPLM) test. 
 
5. Empirical analysis and discussion of the results 
 
Our analysis is composed of estimation of three main groups of models to test our hypotheses. Each main group includes 
two sub-groups of models: one for sub-indicators (entry barriers, public ownership and vertical integration in OECD 
countries) and another for overall indicator (OECD countries, non-OECD countries, all countries). In total, we estimate 18 
models. Since using logarithms of variables enables us to interpret coefficients easily and is an effective way of shrinking 
the distance between values, we transform population density, electricity consumption per capita, GDP per capita and 
imports of goods and services as % of GDP variables into logarithmic form and use these transformed variables in our 
models. 
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We start our analysis by applying Hausman test for fixed versus random effects in each model4. As usual, we prefer 5% 
significance level so any p-value less than 0.05 from Hausman test implies that we should reject the null hypothesis of 
there being no systematic difference in the coefficients. In other words, Hausman test with a p-value up to 0.05 indicates 
significant differences in the coefficients. Therefore, in our analysis, if we get a p-value less than 0.05, we choose fixed 
effects model. However, if p-value from Hausman test is above 0.05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of there being no 
systematic difference in the coefficients at 5% level. In such a case, we apply Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier 
(BPLM) test for random effects in order to decide on using either pooled OLS or random effects in our analysis. This test 
is developed to detect the presence of random effects. In this test, the null hypothesis is that variances of groups are zero; 
that is, there is no unobserved heterogeneity, all groups are similar. If the null is not rejected, the pooled regression model 
is appropriate. That is, if the p-value of BPLM test is below 0.05, we reject the null, meaning that random effects 
specification is the preferred one. If it is above 0.05, we prefer pooled OLS specification to carry out our regression. Tables 
4-9 show a summary of estimation results that present statistically significant coefficients and their standard errors. Full 
details of estimation results are provided in Appendix 1; including the full estimation output, the number of observations 
and the countries included in each model, results of Hausman and BPLM tests and preferred specifications based on these 
tests. 
 
Table 4. Estimation results for the models testing Hypothesis 1 (sub-indicators) 
 
Dependent Variables →  Entry barriers (0-6) 
Public Ownership 
(0-6) 
Vertical integration 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (OECD countries) (OECD countries) 
Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.129*** (0.027) 0.076*** (0.015) 0.128*** (0.025) 
Rural population (% of total population) NS NS NS 
Gini coefficient (0-100) NS NS NS 
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.178*** (0.046) NS 0.109*** (0.042) 
EU member (0-1) -1.61*** (0.319) NS -1.407*** (0.294) 
OECD member (0-1) 1.717*** (0.419) NS 0.907** (0.386) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 1.078*** (0.274) NS 0.521** (0.252) 
Log of population density NS 9.221*** (1.357) NS 
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 2.566*** (0.796) -1.188*** (0.423) NS 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.201*** (0.536) -1.157*** (0.285) -3.679*** (0.494) 
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education NS NS NS 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.415*** (0.582) -0.936*** (0.31) -1.444*** (0.536) 
Constant NS -25.833*** (5.876) 17.055* (10.177) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
Table 5. Estimation results for the models testing Hypothesis 1 (overall indicator) 
 
Dependent Variables →  Overall indicator (0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (Non-OECD countries) (All countries) 
Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.111*** (0.018) 0.057*** (0.012) 0.087*** (0.012) 
Rural population (% of total population) NS -0.157* (0.082) NS 
Gini coefficient (0-100) NS NS NS 
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.091*** (0.03) NS 0.063*** (0.023) 
EU member (0-1) -0.927*** (0.21) 0.463* (0.25) -0.517*** (0.176) 
OECD member (0-1) 0.889*** (0.275) (omitted) 0.551** (0.242) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.569*** (0.18) (omitted) 0.314* (0.164) 
Log of population density 3.153* (1.675) NS NS 
                                                 
4 Throughout the paper, model estimations are carried out and cross-checked by Stata 11.2 and Eviews 7.1. 
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Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) NS 4.001*** (0.568) 1.655*** (0.43) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.345*** (0.352) -3.009*** (0.351) -2.963*** (0.252) 
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education NS NS -0.336*** (0.108) 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.598*** (0.382) NS -1.209*** (0.298) 
Constant NS NS 14.773*** (5.705) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
Table 6. Estimation results for the models testing Hypothesis 2 (sub-indicators) 
 
Dependent Variables →  Entry barriers (0-6) 
Public Ownership 
(0-6) 
Vertical integration 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (OECD countries) (OECD countries) 
Net official assistance and aid received -0.628** (0.311) NS NS 
EU member (0-1) -1.06*** (0.234) 0.227* (0.119) -1.171*** (0.214) 
OECD member (0-1) 2.136*** (0.287) -0.371** (0.147) 1.125*** (0.262) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 1.125*** (0.178) NS 0.626*** (0.162) 
Log of population density NS 7.314*** (0.73) 2.843** (1.307) 
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 2.984*** (0.408) -0.354* (0.208) 1.297*** (0.373) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.987*** (0.347) -1.273*** (0.177) -4.536*** (0.316) 
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.226** (0.103) -0.226*** (0.052) NS 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.491*** (0.399) -0.621*** (0.203) -2.002*** (0.364) 
Constant 23.5*** (5.198) -16.994*** (2.651) 7.825* (4.747) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
Table 7. Estimation results for the models testing Hypothesis 2 (overall indicator) 
 
Dependent Variables →  Overall indicator (0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (Non-OECD countries) (All countries) 
Net official assistance and aid received -0.334* (0.202) -0.557** (0.252) NS 
EU member (0-1) -0.668*** (0.152) NS -0.778*** (0.14) 
OECD member (0-1) 0.964*** (0.187) (omitted) 0.671*** (0.18) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.576*** (0.116) (omitted) 0.342*** (0.108) 
Log of population density 3.429*** (0.933) NS 1.314* (0.698) 
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 1.309*** (0.266) 2.208*** (0.309) 1.571*** (0.213) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.932*** (0.226) -1.898*** (0.219) -3.139*** (0.154) 
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.115* (0.067) -1.353*** (0.209) -0.338*** (0.063) 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.705*** (0.26) NS -1.099*** (0.168) 
Constant NS 11.222* (6) 10.84*** (2.601) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
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Table 8. Estimation results for the models testing Hypotheses 3 and 4 (sub-indicators) 
 
Dependent Variables →  Entry barriers (0-6) 
Public Ownership 
(0-6) 
Vertical integration 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (OECD countries) (OECD countries) 
Single-party government (0-1) NS -0.144* (0.085) -0.229* (0.139) 
The years the chief executive has been in office 0.042** (0.018) 0.033*** (0.009) 0.044*** (0.015) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right NS NS -0.526** (0.211) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.423* (0.246) NS -0.38* (0.214) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Center (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) NS -0.407* (0.231) NS 
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur NS -0.457*** (0.161) -0.591** (0.264) 
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 1.333*** (0.389) NS 1.982*** (0.335) 
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military NS NS NS 
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.482** (0.213) -0.201* (0.117) 0.443** (0.191) 
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other 0.446* (0.243) -0.484*** (0.132) NS 
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.516** (0.227) -0.302** (0.124) 0.725*** (0.202) 
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics NS NS 0.814* (0.468) 
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science NS 1.123*** (0.33) 1.75*** (0.541) 
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university NS NS NS 
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other NS NS NS 
EU member (0-1) -0.829*** (0.233) NS -1.282*** (0.206) 
OECD member (0-1) 1.697*** (0.327) -0.474*** (0.181) 0.966*** (0.293) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.749*** (0.181) NS 0.384** (0.158) 
Log of population density 0.606*** (0.14) NS 0.47** (0.218) 
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 2.886*** (0.318) NS 1.778*** (0.349) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.73*** (0.321) -0.638*** (0.187) -4.266*** (0.299) 
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.24*** (0.085) -0.333*** (0.055) NS 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.202*** (0.272) NS -1.484*** (0.296) 
Constant 16.661*** (1.214) 9.582*** (0.972) 14.172*** (1.352) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
Table 9. Estimation results for the models testing Hypotheses 3 and 4 (overall indicator) 
 
Dependent Variables →  Overall indicator (0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Overall indicator 
(0-6) 
Explanatory Variables ↓ (OECD countries) (Non-OECD countries) (All countries) 
Single-party government (0-1) NS  NS  NS  
The years the chief executive has been in office 0.038*** (0.011) NS  0.031*** (0.01) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right NS  (omitted) NS  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.268* (0.159) NS  -0.273** (0.137) 
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Center (omitted) NS  (omitted) 
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) NS  NS  NS  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.431** (0.196) NS  -0.412** (0.177) 
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 1.195*** (0.248) NS  0.642*** (0.202) 
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military NS  NS  NS  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.262* (0.141) NS  NS  
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Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other NS  NS  NS  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.342** (0.149) NS  NS  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics NS  NS  NS  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science 0.948** (0.402) NS  NS  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university NS  NS  NS  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other NS  NS  NS  
EU member (0-1) -0.752*** (0.152) NS  -0.583*** (0.15) 
OECD member (0-1) 0.791*** (0.215) (omitted) 0.831*** (0.217) 
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.465*** (0.117) (omitted) 0.27** (0.116) 
Log of population density 0.272* (0.141) NS  NS  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 1.696*** (0.249) 2.266*** (0.43) 1.779*** (0.254) 
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.628*** (0.218) -1.245*** (0.37) -3.14*** (0.192) 
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.169*** (0.063) -1.613*** (0.292) -0.321*** (0.068) 
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.954*** (0.212) NS  -1.127*** (0.186) 
Constant 13.918*** (0.94) NS  12.551*** (3.054) 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses () with coefficients. 
“NS”: The coefficient is not significant even at 10% level. 
Coefficient that is significant at ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level. 
 
When we look at the results from the first groups of models (Tables 4 and 5), at first sight, we notice that there is a 
significant negative relationship between electricity market liberalization and the size of industry sector in OECD 
countries, meaning that countries with larger industry sectors tend to liberalize less. Urbanization and income equality 
seem to have almost no significant impact on regulatory reform in electricity markets. Besides, although there seems to be 
no relation between public ownership and polity score, overall we detect a negative correlation between polity score and 
power sector liberalization in OECD countries; that is; we cannot argue that liberalization policies are stronger in more 
democratic countries. These results are also valid for overall indicators for both OECD and non-OECD countries. There 
are two exceptions to this trend. First of all, the market liberalization process seems to speed up in non-OECD countries as 
the share of rural population in total population increases. Second, polity score does not have an impact on reform process 
in non-OECD countries. As for the second groups of models (Tables 6 and 7), apparently, the countries that receive foreign 
financial aid or assistance are likely to liberalize their electricity markets and especially tend to reduce entry barriers to 
their power sector. In the last groups of models (Tables 8 and 9), we see that government structure (coalition or single-
party) has an impact on the reform process in OECD countries but does not seem to affect liberalization process in non-
OECD countries. In OECD countries, single-party governments accelerate the reform process by reducing public 
ownership and vertical integration. Moreover, we detect a negative relationship between the years the chief executive has 
been in office and the reform process in OECD countries. The same relationship is not observed in non-OECD countries. 
Furthermore, we identify a decrease in vertical integration in electricity industry during the terms of parties with “right” or 
“left” ideologies in OECD countries. The ruling parties with “left” ideology seem to reduce entry barriers in OECD 
countries. Economic policy orientation of the ruling party does not affect the reform process in non-OECD countries. 
Similarly, electoral system (majoritarian or presidential) does not seem to influence liberalization process much while entry 
barriers seem to be lower in countries with parliamentary systems. In addition, professional and educational backgrounds 
of head of executive branch (prime minister, president and so on) have very significant impact on reform process in OECD 
countries. Background of head of executive branch is not important in non-OECD countries. Leaders with a professional 
background as entrepreneurs speed up electricity market liberalization process in OECD countries while those with a 
background as economists slow it down. Non-economist scientists decrease public ownership but increase entry barriers. 
We could not detect a statistically significant relationship between a military background and reform process. Head of 
executives with a background as politicians decrease public ownership but increase entry barriers and vertical integration. 
As for educational background, the reforms seem to progress slower in OECD countries if the head of executive has an 
educational background in economics or natural science. Especially, those with a background in economics increase 
vertical integration while those with a background in natural science increase both vertical integration and public 
ownership. The interpretation of the results in detail is as follows: 
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Results from the first group of models testing Hypothesis 1: 
 
(1) In the first group of models, our empirical findings suggest that there is an inverse relationship between the size of 
the industry sector and electricity market liberalization process. As industry value added (as % of GDP) increases 
in a country, power market structure of that country becomes less liberal. For example, if industry value added of 
an OECD country increases from 40% to 50% of GDP; entry barriers, public ownership and vertical integration 
scores (on 0-6 scales) of that country increase by 1.29, 0.76 and 1.28 points, respectively. 
(2) Urbanization and income equality seem to have almost no impact on reform process. The only statistically 
significant impact is that an increase in rural population in non-OECD countries (as % of total population) seems 
to speed up liberalization process in electricity industry; however this impact is quite limited. For instance, if rural 
population in a non-OECD country increases from 20% to 30% of total population, overall indicator (on a 0-6 
scale) of that country decreases by 1.57 points. 
(3) One of the most surprising results is that in most cases there is a negative relationship between polity score and 
electricity market liberalization process in OECD countries, meaning that politically more liberal OECD countries 
prefer to liberalize their electricity markets less. Democracy does not seem to be an important factor explaining 
the reform process in non-OECD countries. For example, if polity score (on a -10 +10 scale) of an OECD country 
increases from 3 to 8, entry barriers and vertical integration scores (on 0-6 scales) of that country increases by 
0.89 and 0.55 points, respectively. 
 
Results from the second group of models testing Hypothesis 2: 
 
(4) Our analysis reveals that countries that receive foreign financial assistance or aid tend to liberalize their electricity 
market more than a country that does not receive any. This finding holds true for both OECD and non-OECD 
countries. However, the tendency of liberalization in OECD countries is towards reducing entry barriers to their 
electricity market. We could not detect any statistically significant impact of assistance or aid on public ownership 
or vertical integration. Our results imply that if an OECD country receives foreign financial assistance or aid, its 
entry barriers score (on a 0-6 scale) reduces by 0.6 point. 
 
Results from the third group of models testing Hypothesis 3: 
 
(5) We could not detect any statistically significant result for the impact of government structure (single party or 
coalition) on overall electricity market liberalization process. The only exception is that single-party governments 
seem to reduce public ownership and vertical integration in OECD countries. The same holds true for the electoral 
system (majoritarian or presidential) with the only exception that public ownership score (on a 0-6 scale) of a 
country with parliamentary system tend to be 0.4 point less than one with presidential system. 
(6) As for economic policy orientation of ruling party, our results imply that right wing governments do not have a 
statistically significant overall effect on reform process. However, we see that they reduce vertical integration in 
OECD countries. On the other hand, left wing governments seem to speed up the reform process in OECD 
countries.  Left wing governments in OECD countries reduce entry barriers and vertical integration scores (on 0-6 
scales) by 0.42 and 0.38 points, respectively. 
(7) Our findings suggest that as the number of years the chief executive has been in office increases, the reform 
progress slows down in OECD countries. We could not detect a statistically significant relationship between 
political stability and reform process for non-OECD countries.    
 
Results from the fourth group of models testing Hypothesis 4: 
 
(8) Our results clearly show that the professional and educational background of head of executives (prime ministers, 
presidents and so on.) are significant for the reform process in OECD countries. For non-OECD countries, we 
could not identify a statistically significant relationship. In OECD countries, leaders with an educational 
background in economics or natural sciences influence the reform process. We could not detect such an effect for 
other university degrees. The same influence holds true for leaders with a professional background as 
businessman, scientist (economist and others), or politician. Our results do not indicate significant results for 
military officers. 
(9) We observe a negative relationship between an educational background in economics or natural sciences and the 
vertical integration score in OECD countries. This relationship is much stronger with an educational background 
in natural sciences. Our findings suggest that if the head of executive of a country has an educational background 
in economics or natural sciences, vertical integration score (on a 0-6 scale) of that country increases by 0.81 and 
1.75 points, respectively. As for entry barriers and public ownership, we could not detect a meaningful 
relationship for an educational background in economics but leaders with a background in natural sciences seem 
to increase public ownership by 1.1 point. 
(10) As for professional backgrounds, our study finds that businessmen speed up the regulatory reform in OECD 
countries while scientists (economists) and politicians slow the liberalization process down. If head of executive 
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of a country has a professional background as entrepreneur, then public ownership and vertical integration scores 
(on 0-6 scales) of that country reduce by 0.45 and 0.59 points, respectively. On the other hand, if s/he has a 
professional background as scientist (economist), entry barriers and vertical integration scores increase by 1.33 
and 1.98 points, correspondingly. 
(11) In OECD countries, heads of executive with a professional background as politician decreases public ownership 
but increases entry barriers and vertical integration. On the other hand, those with a background as scientist (other 
than economist) have a tendency to increase entry barriers but to reduce public ownership. 
 
Results from control variables: 
 
(12) Out of 18 models we estimate, 12 models suggest that being an EU member country considerably contributes to 
efforts for electricity market liberalization. In most cases, this effect is large and statistically significant even at 
1% level. The reverse holds true for being an OECD country. The results from 12 models imply that being an 
OECD country slows down electricity market liberalization process. The relative magnitude of these effects 
changes from one model to another. Therefore, being a member of both EU and OECD does not have a uniform 
effect on the reform process. 
(13) Surprisingly, the existence of electricity market reform idea limits the reform progress, which implies that the 
early reformers had an advantage than the late comers in terms of reform implementation. This result may be 
explained by reform failures in some countries (e.g. California disaster). 
(14) Population density and electricity consumption per capita seem to have a negative correlation with liberalization 
process in power industry, meaning that densely populated countries with higher per capita electricity 
consumption tend to liberalize their electricity markets less. 
(15) On the other hand, per capita income, education level and imports of goods and services (% of GDP) tend to have 
a positive correlation with liberalization process. Countries with higher per capita income and education level that 
import a higher portion of goods and services from abroad introduce more reform elements in their electricity 
markets. 
(16) Finally, we see that country specific features tend to have a high power in explaining regulatory reform in 
electricity industries. 
 
To sum up, based on our results, we reject Hypothesis 1 and partially reject Hypothesis 3; but clearly fail to reject 
Hypotheses 2 and 4. 
 
6. Limitations of the study 
 
The research may have a number of limitations that we acknowledge. In fact, we have no reason to believe that any of 
these limitations should be existent in our analysis, but cannot of course rule them out. 
 
To begin with, like all other econometric studies on electricity reform, the issue of endogeneity may be raised in our study. 
The analysis dealt to some extent with this potential problem by including country and year fixed effects. The country 
fixed effects control for country-specific propensities to reform and matters such as institutional characteristics, and year 
fixed effects control for any general trend in the reform of electricity sector.  
 
Another shortcoming may originate from the limited nature of data, due to which we could not properly account for the 
impact of some other variables on electricity market reform process like institutional characteristics, technological 
innovations and changes to regulatory practices. For instance, a possible source of bias in our study is that the model does 
not control for market power or institutional structure of the electricity industry. Besides, problems associated with 
qualitative nature of data collection process tend to reduce the usefulness of cross-country data. 
 
Some aspects of electricity reforms are not readily quantifiable in physical or monetary units (Jamasb et al. 2004). That is 
to say, objective comparisons across countries are inherently difficult in any study and our analysis is not an exception. 
The main steps of electricity reform process are usually established progressively and have a qualitative dimension. 
Accounting for these measures with the use of dummy variables does not reveal their true scope or intensity. To lessen the 
impact of this drawback, we did not use individual dummy variables for reform elements in our study. Instead, we used 
various electricity market reform indicators constructed by OECD and EBRD. Although such an approach seems a 
practical and reasonable representation of market type, we cannot argue that we reflected all characteristics of the various 
reform processes in our study. 
 
Our sample is composed of 55 countries for which we could obtain data on all variables in our model. There will be sample 
selection bias if the countries making this data available have differing results for the dependent variables than those which 
do not make data available. Moreover, any measurement error and omission of explanatory variables may bias estimates of 
all coefficients in the models. However, in our study, omitted variables may be captured at least in part by the country-
specific effects, mitigating the potential for bias. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we empirically analyze the political economy of reform in the electricity industries of 55 countries during the 
period 1975–2010, with the aim of shedding light on the differing pace of reform in different countries. The use of a 
unique data set obtained by merging different data sources on political, government and reform structures as well as private 
interests and government ideologies allows us to explore time-series and cross-sectional variation in the political process of 
economic liberalization. Our findings are consistent with the rationale that the structure of political economic system has a 
strong effect on reform outcomes, and that the relative strength of economic and political variables matters for the 
implementation of the reforms. That is, consistent with a generalized interest group theory, our results suggest that a 
portion of the cross-country reform experiences of the electricity sector in the past three decades can be explained by 
differences in the political structure, in the ideology of the government and in the professional and educational 
backgrounds of the political leaders. 
 
In the course of the study, we discover that democracy negatively affect the pace of reforms, maybe, by magnifying the 
voices of anti-reform interest groups. We also surprisingly notice that countries with a strong presence of pro-reform 
interest groups, indicated by a larger industrial sector, are less likely to liberalize their power industry. This may be an 
indication that industrial consumers prefer guaranteed subsidized prices in a closed market to the possibility of future 
reduced prices in a liberal market. Besides, as expected, our results imply that countries receiving foreign financial support 
are more likely to liberalize their electricity markets, which underlines the point that reforms may not be always voluntary. 
We also discover that government structure (coalition or single-party) has an impact on the reform process in OECD 
countries but does not seem to affect liberalization process in non-OECD countries. In OECD countries, single-party 
governments accelerate the reform process. Moreover, we see a negative relationship between the years the chief executive 
has been in office and the reform progress in OECD countries, which falsifies the assumed linkage between political 
stability and reform progress. Furthermore, our study identifies a decrease in vertical integration in electricity industry 
during the terms of parties with “right” or “left” ideologies in OECD countries. The ruling parties with “left” ideology 
seem also to reduce entry barriers in OECD countries. 
 
The study also analyze whether politicians’ education and profession matter for the introduction of market reforms. 
Overall, our results show that education and professional background of leaders are associated with the implementation of 
market reforms. According to our results, reforms are more likely to occur if the head of government has been an 
entrepreneur before entering into politics. Personal capabilities required to manage a company thus seem to be 
advantageous in promoting economic reform. Moreover, during the tenure of former professional economists, reforms are 
less likely. We also provide evidence that the reforms seem to progress slower in OECD countries if the head of executive 
has an educational background in economics or natural science. Especially, those with a background in economics increase 
vertical integration while those with a background in natural science increase both vertical integration and public 
ownership in the sector. In summary, our analysis confirms that the personal background of political leaders may be 
important. Clearly, other characteristics of politicians also matter for successful policy, and profession and education alone 
do not guarantee success. Besides, the focus of our analysis is restricted to economic reforms. Arguably, other policy 
dimensions are equally important than economic policy. Whether and to what extent those types of education and 
profession identified here as being supportive for market-oriented liberal reforms are also successful in other areas remains 
for future research. 
 
What implication(s) can be derived from these findings for the electricity industry and, to some extent, for other 
infrastructure industries? The most important single policy implication is that future reforms should give due attention to 
the political economic environment of the countries. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Estimation Results 
 
Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
1.1.1 Entry barriers (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.129 0.027 4.720 0.00 28 456 499.40 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) 0.091 0.058 1.580 0.12 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.022 0.023 -0.930 0.35 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.178 0.046 3.910 0.00 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -1.610 0.319 -5.040 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 1.717 0.419 4.100 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 1.078 0.274 3.930 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 0.427 2.552 0.170 0.87 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 2.566 0.796 3.220 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.201 0.536 -9.700 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.282 0.182 -1.550 0.12 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.415 0.582 -4.150 0.00 
       
  
Constant 14.124 11.049 1.280 0.20 
       1.1.2 Public Ownership (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.076 0.015 5.200 0.00 28 456 72.18 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) -0.015 0.031 -0.500 0.62 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.012 0.012 -0.980 0.33 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) -0.013 0.024 -0.550 0.58 
       
  
EU member (0-1) 0.235 0.170 1.380 0.17 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.043 0.223 0.190 0.85 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.107 0.146 0.730 0.46 
       
  
Log of population density 9.221 1.357 6.790 0.00 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) -1.188 0.423 -2.810 0.01 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -1.157 0.285 -4.060 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.120 0.097 -1.240 0.22 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.936 0.310 -3.020 0.00 
       
  
Constant -25.833 5.876 -4.400 0.00 
       1.1.3 Vertical integration (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.128 0.025 5.080 0.00 28 456 60.18 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) -0.084 0.053 -1.570 0.12 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) 0.005 0.021 0.210 0.83 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.109 0.042 2.590 0.01 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -1.407 0.294 -4.780 0.00 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.907 0.386 2.350 0.02 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.521 0.252 2.060 0.04 
       
  
Log of population density -0.187 2.351 -0.080 0.94 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 0.266 0.733 0.360 0.72 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.679 0.494 -7.450 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.076 0.168 -0.450 0.65 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.444 0.536 -2.690 0.01 
       
  
Constant 17.055 10.177 1.680 0.10 
       1.2.1 Overall indicator (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.111 0.018 6.180 0.00 28 456 74.78 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) -0.003 0.038 -0.070 0.94 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.010 0.015 -0.640 0.52 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.091 0.030 3.050 0.00 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.927 0.210 -4.430 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.889 0.275 3.240 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.569 0.180 3.160 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 3.153 1.675 1.880 0.06 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 0.548 0.522 1.050 0.30 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.345 0.352 -9.510 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.160 0.120 -1.330 0.18 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.598 0.382 -4.180 0.00 
       
  
Constant 1.782 7.251 0.250 0.81 
       1.2.2 Overall indicator (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.057 0.012 4.550 0.00 17 150 80.09 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(Non-OECD countries) Rural population (% of total population) -0.157 0.082 -1.910 0.06 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.023 0.015 -1.470 0.14 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) -0.033 0.025 -1.300 0.20 
       
  
EU member (0-1) 0.463 0.250 1.850 0.07 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Log of population density 2.136 2.667 0.800 0.43 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 4.001 0.568 7.050 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.009 0.351 -8.580 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.246 0.296 -0.830 0.41 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.038 0.329 0.110 0.91 
       
  
Constant 3.938 11.972 0.330 0.74 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
1.2.3 Overall indicator (0-6) Industry value added (% of GDP) 0.087 0.012 7.070 0.00 45 606 87.72 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(All countries) Rural population (% of total population) 0.005 0.032 0.160 0.88 
       
  
Gini coefficient (0-100) -0.014 0.013 -1.080 0.28 
       
  
Polity score (-10,+10) 0.063 0.023 2.780 0.01 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.517 0.176 -2.930 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.551 0.242 2.280 0.02 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.314 0.164 1.920 0.06 
       
  
Log of population density -0.451 1.314 -0.340 0.73 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 1.655 0.430 3.850 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -2.963 0.252 -11.740 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.336 0.108 -3.120 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.209 0.298 -4.060 0.00 
       
  
Constant 14.773 5.705 2.590 0.01 
       2.1.1 Entry barriers (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.628 0.311 -2.020 0.04 30 764 83.97 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) EU member (0-1) -1.060 0.234 -4.530 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 2.136 0.287 7.430 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 1.125 0.178 6.340 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 0.131 1.431 0.090 0.93 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 2.984 0.408 7.310 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.987 0.347 -17.280 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.226 0.103 -2.200 0.03 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.491 0.399 -6.250 0.00 
       
  
Constant 23.500 5.198 4.520 0.00 
       2.1.2 Public Ownership (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.120 0.159 -0.760 0.45 30 764 123.73 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) EU member (0-1) 0.227 0.119 1.910 0.06 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) -0.371 0.147 -2.530 0.01 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) -0.024 0.091 -0.270 0.79 
       
  
Log of population density 7.314 0.730 10.020 0.00 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) -0.354 0.208 -1.700 0.09 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -1.273 0.177 -7.200 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.226 0.052 -4.310 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.621 0.203 -3.050 0.00 
       
  
Constant -16.994 2.651 -6.410 0.00 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
2.1.3 Vertical integration (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.252 0.284 -0.890 0.37 30 764 19.84 0.0189 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) EU member (0-1) -1.171 0.214 -5.480 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 1.125 0.262 4.290 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.626 0.162 3.860 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 2.843 1.307 2.180 0.03 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 1.297 0.373 3.480 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -4.536 0.316 -14.330 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education 0.108 0.094 1.160 0.25 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -2.002 0.364 -5.500 0.00 
       
  
Constant 7.825 4.747 1.650 0.10 
       2.2.1 Overall indicator (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.334 0.202 -1.650 0.10 30 764 855.87 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(OECD countries) EU member (0-1) -0.668 0.152 -4.380 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.964 0.187 5.140 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.576 0.116 4.980 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 3.429 0.933 3.680 0.00 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 1.309 0.266 4.920 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.932 0.226 -17.410 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.115 0.067 -1.710 0.09 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.705 0.260 -6.560 0.00 
       
  
Constant 4.777 3.387 1.410 0.16 
       2.2.2 Overall indicator (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.557 0.252 -2.210 0.03 17 271 140.97 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(Non-OECD countries) EU member (0-1) 0.480 0.398 1.200 0.23 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Log of population density 1.823 1.354 1.350 0.18 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 2.208 0.309 7.150 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -1.898 0.219 -8.650 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -1.353 0.209 -6.480 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.104 0.204 -0.510 0.61 
       
  
Constant 11.222 6.000 1.870 0.06 
       2.2.3 Overall indicator (0-6) Net official assistance and aid received -0.191 0.165 -1.160 0.25 47 1,035 56.45 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(All countries) EU member (0-1) -0.778 0.140 -5.540 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.671 0.180 3.730 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.342 0.108 3.180 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 1.314 0.698 1.880 0.06 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 1.571 0.213 7.390 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.139 0.154 -20.360 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.338 0.063 -5.390 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.099 0.168 -6.560 0.00 
       
  
Constant 10.840 2.601 4.170 0.00 
       3.1.1 Entry barriers (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) 0.053 0.162 0.330 0.74 29 710 3.40 1.0000 326.16 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
(OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.042 0.018 2.360 0.02 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right -0.306 0.242 -1.270 0.21 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.423 0.246 -1.720 0.09 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) 0.538 0.361 1.490 0.14 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.326 0.309 -1.060 0.29 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 1.333 0.389 3.430 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.344 0.415 0.830 0.41 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.482 0.213 2.260 0.02 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other 0.446 0.243 1.840 0.07 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.516 0.227 2.270 0.02 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics -0.085 0.556 -0.150 0.88 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science -0.235 0.640 -0.370 0.71 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university -0.519 0.579 -0.900 0.37 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.042 0.605 -0.070 0.94 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.829 0.233 -3.560 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 1.697 0.327 5.190 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.749 0.181 4.140 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 0.606 0.140 4.340 0.00 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 2.886 0.318 9.070 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -5.730 0.321 -17.860 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.240 0.085 -2.830 0.01 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.202 0.272 -4.420 0.00 
       
  
Constant 16.661 1.214 13.730 0.00 
       3.1.2 Public Ownership (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) -0.144 0.085 -1.690 0.09 29 710 14.85 0.8687 2929.78 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
(OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.033 0.009 3.660 0.00 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right 0.074 0.129 0.570 0.57 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.203 0.131 -1.550 0.12 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
38 
 
Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) -0.407 0.231 -1.760 0.08 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.457 0.161 -2.840 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 0.056 0.204 0.270 0.79 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.103 0.230 0.450 0.65 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician -0.201 0.117 -1.720 0.09 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other -0.484 0.132 -3.670 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.302 0.124 -2.430 0.02 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics 0.163 0.285 0.570 0.57 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science 1.123 0.330 3.410 0.00 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university 0.126 0.295 0.430 0.67 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.120 0.313 0.380 0.70 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.016 0.127 -0.130 0.90 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) -0.474 0.181 -2.610 0.01 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.114 0.097 1.180 0.24 
       
  
Log of population density -0.118 0.181 -0.650 0.51 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 0.232 0.228 1.020 0.31 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -0.638 0.187 -3.410 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.333 0.055 -6.050 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.196 0.191 1.030 0.31 
       
  
Constant 9.582 0.972 9.860 0.00 
       3.1.3 Vertical integration (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) -0.229 0.139 -1.650 0.10 29 710 16.93 0.7153 1075.26 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
(OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.044 0.015 2.970 0.00 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right -0.526 0.211 -2.500 0.01 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.380 0.214 -1.770 0.08 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) 0.078 0.365 0.210 0.83 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.591 0.264 -2.240 0.03 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 1.982 0.335 5.920 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military -0.173 0.373 -0.460 0.64 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.443 0.191 2.330 0.02 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other -0.043 0.215 -0.200 0.84 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.725 0.202 3.590 0.00 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics 0.814 0.468 1.740 0.08 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science 1.750 0.541 3.230 0.00 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university 0.659 0.486 1.360 0.18 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.507 0.513 0.990 0.32 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -1.282 0.206 -6.220 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.966 0.293 3.300 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.384 0.158 2.430 0.02 
       
  
Log of population density 0.470 0.218 2.150 0.03 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 1.778 0.349 5.090 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -4.266 0.299 -14.280 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education 0.047 0.087 0.540 0.59 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.484 0.296 -5.010 0.00 
       
  
Constant 14.172 1.352 10.480 0.00 
       3.2.1 Overall indicator (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) -0.113 0.103 -1.090 0.28 29 710 14.82 0.8698 988.55 0.0000 Random Effects 
 
(OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.038 0.011 3.400 0.00 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right -0.191 0.156 -1.230 0.22 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.268 0.159 -1.690 0.09 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) 0.118 0.265 0.450 0.66 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.431 0.196 -2.200 0.03 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 1.195 0.248 4.810 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.111 0.275 0.400 0.69 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.262 0.141 1.860 0.06 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other 0.021 0.159 0.130 0.90 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.342 0.149 2.290 0.02 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics 0.328 0.348 0.940 0.35 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science 0.948 0.402 2.360 0.02 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university 0.130 0.362 0.360 0.72 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.268 0.381 0.700 0.48 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.752 0.152 -4.940 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.791 0.215 3.670 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.465 0.117 3.980 0.00 
       
  
Log of population density 0.272 0.141 1.920 0.05 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 1.696 0.249 6.830 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.628 0.218 -16.610 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.169 0.063 -2.700 0.01 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.954 0.212 -4.510 0.00 
           Constant 13.918 0.940 14.810 0.00               
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
3.2.2 Overall indicator (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) 0.137 0.156 0.880 0.38 14 194 142.00 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(Non-OECD countries) The years the chief executive has been in office -0.002 0.023 -0.100 0.92 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right (omitted)       
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.041 0.213 -0.190 0.85 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre 0.002 0.267 0.010 1.00 
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) -0.504 0.567 -0.890 0.38 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur 0.276 0.363 0.760 0.45 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics -0.418 0.336 -1.240 0.22 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.080 0.414 0.190 0.85 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician -0.341 0.369 -0.920 0.36 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other 0.139 0.343 0.400 0.69 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.028 0.238 -0.120 0.91 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics -0.234 0.540 -0.430 0.67 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science -0.273 0.479 -0.570 0.57 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university -0.357 0.505 -0.710 0.48 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.174 0.792 -0.220 0.83 
       
  
EU member (0-1) 0.515 0.393 1.310 0.19 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) (omitted)       
       
  
Log of population density 1.379 2.110 0.650 0.51 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 2.266 0.430 5.280 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -1.245 0.370 -3.370 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -1.613 0.292 -5.530 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -0.098 0.228 -0.430 0.67 
           Constant 14.494 10.103 1.430 0.15               
3.2.3 Overall indicator (0-6) Single-party government (0-1) 0.105 0.091 1.150 0.25 43 904 142.75 0.0000 - - Fixed Effects 
 
(All countries) The years the chief executive has been in office 0.031 0.010 3.120 0.00 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Right -0.122 0.134 -0.910 0.36 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Left -0.273 0.137 -1.990 0.05 
       
  
Economic policy orientation of ruling party: Centre (omitted)       
       
  
Parliamentary regimes (0-1) 0.058 0.241 0.240 0.81 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Entrepreneur -0.412 0.177 -2.330 0.02 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Economics 0.642 0.202 3.180 0.00 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Military 0.030 0.218 0.140 0.89 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Politician 0.091 0.130 0.700 0.49 
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Models Dependent variable Explanatory variables Coef. Std. Err. t-stat. p value 
# of # of Hausman Test BPLM Test Preferred 
countries observations Statistic p-value Statistic p-value Specification 
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Scientist, Other -0.134 0.142 -0.940 0.35 
       
  
Prof. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other 0.168 0.127 1.320 0.19 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Economics -0.127 0.289 -0.440 0.66 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Natural science 0.212 0.319 0.660 0.51 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Other university -0.401 0.296 -1.350 0.18 
       
  
Educ. bgr. of head of executive: Unknown/other -0.257 0.321 -0.800 0.43 
       
  
EU member (0-1) -0.583 0.150 -3.890 0.00 
       
  
OECD member (0-1) 0.831 0.217 3.820 0.00 
       
  
Existence of electricity market reform idea (0-1) 0.270 0.116 2.340 0.02 
       
  
Log of population density 0.800 0.813 0.980 0.33 
       
  
Log of electricity cons. per capita (MWh) 1.779 0.254 7.010 0.00 
       
  
Log of GDP per capita (PPP, cur. thousand int. $) -3.140 0.192 -16.380 0.00 
       
  
Average num. of years of adult (25+) education -0.321 0.068 -4.720 0.00 
       
  
Log of imports of goods and services (% of GDP) -1.127 0.186 -6.050 0.00 
           Constant 12.551 3.054 4.110 0.00               
 
